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Abstract. In the almost 20 years since GSM was deployed several se-
curity problems have been found, both in the protocols and in the - orig-
inally secret - cryptography. However, practical exploits of these weak-
nesses are complicated because of all the signal processing involved and
have not been seen much outside of their use by law enforcement agen-
cies.
This could change due to recently developed open-source equipment and
software that can capture and digitize signals from the GSM frequencies.
This might make practical attacks against GSMmuch simpler to perform.
Indeed, several claims have recently appeared in the media on success-
fully eavesdropping on GSM. When looking at these claims in depth
the conclusion is often that more is claimed than what they are actu-
ally capable of. However, it is undeniable that these claims herald the
possibilities to eavesdrop on GSM using publicly available equipment.
This paper evaluates the claims and practical possibilities when it comes
to eavesdropping on GSM, using relatively cheap hardware and open
source initiatives which have generated many headlines over the past
year. The basis of the paper is extensive experiments with the USRP
(Universal Software Radio Peripheral) and software projects for this
hardware.
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1 Introduction
GSM was developed in the late 1980s and deployed in most Western
countries in the early 1990s. Since then GSM has seen an enormous rise
both in its coverage and in the number of subscribers.
GSM is perhaps the most successful technology of the last twenty
years. A survey by the International Tellecommunication Union (ITU)
showed that by the end of 2008 around 1.5 billion people in the world
(some 23%) use the Internet. But there were around 4.1 billion people in
the world (over 60%) who had a mobile subscription, while over 90% of
the worlds population lived in a region that at least has access to GSM
[1]. These are staggering numbers showing a tremendous spread of GSM
technology.
The fact that GSM has weaknesses is nothing new. The lack of mutual
authentication in GSM – a mobile phone authenticates itself to the cell
tower, but not vice versa – was quickly seen as a problem [2]. Also GSM
specifically does not use point to point encryption between callers. It only
encrypts the messages while on the air interface. This allows law enforcers
to tap conversations in the core of the GSM network.
Meanwhile more and more services are being deployed on top of the
GSM network, increasing the incentive for criminals to attack GSM. In
several countries you can pay for services or products via text messaging.
Several Internet banking applications use the mobile phone as an exter-
nal (out-of-band) channel to verify transactions. The Dutch ING bank
stated only last January that they will start to use the mobile phone to
send users their password reminders, even though they already use it for
transaction verification [3]. Where previously making un-billed calls was
the major economic attraction in attacking GSM, increasingly real money
can be made.
At the end of 2009 some pretty large tables usable for a brute-force
attack against the main cipher used in GSM where released. This has
let to many wild claims on the insecurity of GSM in the media. This
document examines the feasibility of these claims, based on experimental
work with a USRP – an open-hardware generic radio transceiver – and
several open-source software products, which could, in theory, be used to
eavesdrop on GSM.
At about the same time some practical examples of Man-in-the-Middle
(MITM) attacks on GSM surfaced. These are possible because in GSM
the cell towers do not authenticate themselves to the mobile phones. So
it is possible to act as a cell tower towards a mobile phone. Currently
these attacks lack the ability to act as a cell phone towards a cell tower,
so only a limited form of a MITM attack has been shown, in which an
attacker acts as a genuine cell tower, instructs the cell phone to not use
encryption, and transfers outgoing calls via a VOIP connection. This
attack can only capture calls being made from the cell phone under attack,
and not incoming calls. This document will limit itself to eavesdropping,
and thus excludes these MITM attacks.
Section 2 discusses the equipment that was used during our experi-
ments. Section 3 will discuss the theoretical steps required to passively
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eavesdrop on GSM, while Section 4 will discuss the current status of sev-
eral practical projects implementing these steps. Section 5 discusses some
possible countermeasures against an eavesdropping attack.
2 Equipment used
In order to evaluate the practicality of eavesdropping attacks, we experi-
mented with some hard and software. Specifically this were:
– The USRP,
– combined with the DBSRX daughter board
– and running GNU Radio and AirProbe.
– A Nokia 3210 mobile phone
– connected to a pc running the Gammu software.
The USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) is a general purpose,
open-hardware, transceiver that can be linked to a computer via USB,
and handles the receive part of an eavesdropping attack. The USRP, and
its successor, USRP2, are discussed in more detail in Section 4.1.
The USRP has to be extended with a daughter board in order to
receive the correct frequency spectrum. We used the DBSRX daughter
board in this research, which is a 800MHz to 2.4GHz receive-only board,
covering all basic GSM frequency bands.
The USRP was controlled using the GNU Radio software and the
AirProbe software on top of that. Both software products are detailed in
Sections 4.1 and 4.3.
Next to this we also made extensive use of a Nokia 3210 GSM phone,
connected to a computer, also via USB, running the open-source Gammu
[4] project. This combination enabled us to force the Nokia 3210 in a
debug mode that transparently logs all packets sent to and from the
phone.
The Gammu + Nokia phone method has much better reception than
the USRP + AirProbe, after all the mobile phone is specifically made to
receive these signals. Though you can only see the messages to or from the
specific phone connected to the computer. You cannot see any message
for other phones, nor is it possible to change the phone’s behavior in this.
So this is a great practical aid to get a better grasp of the GSM protocol
and to finetune the USRP, but it lacks the versatility to be useful in a
eavesdropping attack.
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3 How to eavesdrop on GSM in theory?
Eavesdropping on GSM, or probably any communication system for that
matter, can be broken down into three stages:
1. Capturing the signals.
2. Decrypting the captured signals.
3. Interpreting the decrypted signals.
This section will look at these steps in more detail. Section 4 will look at
the current state of practical open-source projects usable for these steps.
3.1 Capturing the signals
Already the first stage has been a major obstacle for many years. Special-
ized equipment to capture the GSM signals has long been very expensive
and often proprietary. GSM can be used on several frequency bands, but
most commonly used are the GSM-900 and GSM-1800 bands. The fre-
quency bands are divided into channels of 200 KHz wide each. In a typical
conversation two of these channels will be used at any given time for a
mobile phone to communicate with the cell tower; one channel for each
direction. These channels are separated by a constant offset.
One part of user data in a GSM network, e.g. 20ms of speech data,
is transmitted in four packets, called bursts in GSM. These bursts are
modulated radio waves transmitted in a time slot of 576.9 µs. Most GSM
networks employ channel hopping, which is used as a signal quality mea-
sure, and causes the transmission to switch to a new channel after every
single burst. The challenge in capturing the GSM signals lies in receiving
the bursts on time and in demodulating them correctly.
Section 4.1 discusses projects and hardware that can be used to cap-
ture GSM signals.
3.2 Decrypting the captured signals
Assuming that encryption is enabled on the GSM network, decrypting the
captured bursts is the next step. There are three encryption algorithms
defined for GSM; A5/1 and A5/2, both stream ciphers, and A5/3, a block
cipher. Of these three A5/2 is by far the weakest and can be broken in less
than a second on a personal computer with only a few dozen milliseconds
of cipher text [5]. The A5/3 algorithm is considered the strongest encryp-
tion of the three. A5/3 very recently saw a theoretical break [6]. This
attacks requires 226 chosen plain text messages encrypted under related
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keys. For now this does not lead to a practical attack on A5/3, though
it is cause for concern since this weakness does not exist in MISTY, the
cipher that A5/3 was based on. At the moment of writing no attack on
A5/3 is feasible, the future will tell whether this remains so.
A5/1 is the main encryption algorithm used in most Western coun-
tries. It is a stream cipher with three registers that clock irregularly and
have a combined size of 64 bits — which, conveniently, is also the size
of the session key. The session key is computed by the SIM card and in
the provider’s home network from a random challenge and a secret key
by an undisclosed proprietary algorithm. Originally most providers used
an algorithm called COMP128, which was reverse engineered in 1998 by
Briceno et. al. [7]. This showed that COMP128 actually delivered a 54
bits session key with ten appended zeros. It is unknown which algorithms
are currently used by providers to generate the session key and if the
session keys are still weakened.
The A5/1 algorithm was actually the first encryption algorithm used
in GSM. It was originally kept secret and was only disclosed to GSM
manufacturers under an NDA. In 1999 though, Marc Briceno reverse en-
gineered the design of both A5/1 and A5/2 from a GSM phone [7]. Several
attacks against A5/1 have been published since then [8,5,9].
Recently a practical implementation for a brute-force Time-Memory-
Trade-Off attack against A5/1 was announced, which will be discussed
in Section 4.2. This attack is in fact an improved version of an attack
proposed by Elad Barkan et. al. in 2003 [5].
3.3 Interpreting the decrypted signals
After the signals have been captured and deciphered they still need to be
interpreted. The payload of the bursts needs to be reordered and can be
checked for transmission errors. Besides the cryptography, all the specifi-
cations of GSM are public, so this does not require any reverse engineer-
ing.
Several projects that implement a GSM stack are discussed in Section
4.3
4 The open-source practical implementation
Eavesdropping on GSM is possible — equipment can be bought that
allows for eavesdropping on A5/1 and A5/2 encrypted conversations [10],
but this equipment is sold restrictively to law enforcement agencies and
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military and at a high price. So it is not a question on whether it is
possible to eavesdrop on GSM, but rather how hard it is using publicly
available hardware.
Recently several open-source projects have surfaced that either aim
to prove the insecurity of GSM, or simply offering open-source imple-
mentations of core GSM network elements. So how far are the practical
realizations of the three steps from the previous section in the open-source
community? For each of these steps there is a possible open-source project
to use. Respectively these are:
1. USRP together with GnuRadio and AirProbe, usable for signal cap-
turing
2. Kraken, for the decryption of the captured signals
3. OpenBTS or OpenBSC or AirProbe, to interpret the messages
Because the AirProbe project is actually a collection of tools usable both
for capturing and for the interpreting of the GSM bursts, the project is
listed twice. We will now look at each of these projects in more detail.
4.1 Capturing using USRP together with GnuRadio and
AirProbe
Capturing GSM signals can be done using the USRP and GNU Radio
combination. The Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) is an
open-hardware device developed by Matt Ettus and which can be or-
dered through his company Ettus Research [11]. It is a transceiver that
can be linked to a computer and can be tailored to specific frequencies
by extending it with daughter boards and attaching the appropriate an-
tenna. The USRP contains a programmable FPGA which can be used
to perform some signal processing. In its standard configuration a USRP
creates 16 bit I and Q samples when receiving a given frequency. These
are complex samples, with the real part (Q) describing the cosine of the
signal, and the imaginary part (I) describing the sine of the signal plus
90 degrees. One sample is thus 32 bit long and can be sent to the host
computer through the communication port, for further processing.
There are currently two types: the USRP and the USRP2. The USRP
(or USRP1) can receive a bandwidth of 32MHz and can transmit on a
bandwidth of 64MHz. It transmits the samples to the host computer via
a USB2.0 connection, which has a practical maximum data throughput of
32 Mbyte/s. The USRP2 can receive a bandwidth of 50 MHz and transmit
on a bandwidth of 200 MHz wide. Compared to the USRP1, the USRP2
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also contains a much faster FPGA and a Gigabit Ethernet port instead
of the USB connection.
The USRPs have a 64MHz crystal oscillator internal clock, while most
GSM phones use a 13MHz symbol clock with a much better accuracy. Of
course the 64MHz samples can be re-sampled to (a multiple of) 13MHz,
although this brings an extra computing complexity. Also the USRP’s
oscillators are much less accurate and can show quite some drift when
compared to GSM system clocks, resulting in bad reception. An external
clock can be attached to the USRPs. Using a more accurate external clock
providing a pulse at (a multiple of) 13MHz solves these issues.
GNU Radio [12] is a free software toolkit licensed under GPL for im-
plementing software-defined radios. It was started by Eric Blossom. It
works with several different types of RF hardware, such as soundcards,
but it is mostly used in combination with an USRP. Basically GNU Radio
is a library containing lots of standard signal processing functions, such
as filters and (de)modulations.
GNU Radio, out-of-the-box, does not offer much in terms of GSM
sniffing capabilities. However, GNU Radio can be used by other software
packages, such as AirProbe, to perform the low level functions of GSM
sniffing, such as reception and demodulation. AirProbe [13] is an open-
source project trying to built an air-interface analysis tool for the GSM
(and possible later 3G) mobile phone standard. One part of the project
handles the reception of GSM signals (using the GNU Radio functions)
while another part can also be used to interpret the GSM signals, which
is why we will get back to AirProbe in section 4.3. Currently AirProbe
is only able to listen to the down link (cell tower → mobile phone) of
conversations, so some development is still required.
The main problem for reception is the channel hopping used in most
GSM networks. Using the AirProbe software out of the box helps you
receive a single carrier on the down link (messages from cell tower to
mobile). In order to capture an entire conversation when channel hopping
is used, you will need a way to gather all the bursts on all the different
frequencies. There are two general approaches to achieve this:
I. Let the USRP follow the hopping sequence.
II. Capture all possible frequencies and attempt to follow the sequence
afterwards.
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Approach I requires a lot of processing inside the USRP’s FPGA. All the
parameters for the hopping sequence need to be retrieved from certain
bursts, then the hopping sequence needs to be calculated and followed for
every burst. There are three possible configurations for mobile networks
in which to transmit the hopping sequence parameters. In one of these the
parameters are transmitted in the clear. In the other two configurations
these parameters are transmitted after encryption has been enabled. Dur-
ing our experiments we only ever observed cell towers that use so-called
“early assignment”, in which the hopping parameters are transmitted un-
der encryption. Besides, the network can always command a new hopping
sequence under encryption, irrespective of which configuration is used.
This necessitates breaking the encryption really fast in order to follow
the hopping sequence in time. This is currently not possible. The USRP’s
FPGA only samples a certain frequency at a certain rate and sends these
samples to a computer. So having the FPGA decrypt and interpret the
bursts in order to follow the hopping sequence will require a lot of im-
plementation. It is questionable whether even the USRP2’s much faster
FPGA will be able to decrypt messages and then compute the hopping
sequence in time. This approach might need additional FPGAs, and thus
additional costs, to pull off. Also the tune delays of the USRP’s hard-
ware (the time between a “tune” command and the moment the USRP
retrieves usable samples from the desired frequency) seem to large at the
moment and need to be brought down. However, it is an approach that
should work for every cell tower and regardless of the amount of traffic.
Approach II requires the capture of large amounts of data, namely to
log all channels and determine the hopping sequence later. The problem
here lies in reducing the data the USRP sends on to the computer. A hop-
ping sequence can maximally hop between 64 carrier frequencies. These
carriers are all 200 KHz wide, and can be spread out evenly on the entire
GSM spectrum. So worst case the attacker has to capture the entire GSM
band (for GSM900 this is 25MHz for the up or down link). The problem
here is data throughput to the PC. Each sample of an USRP is repre-
sented by two 16 bit numbers. For the USRP1’s USB2.0 connection this
means that the maximum bandwidth that can be sent to the computer is
around 8MHz (8MHz ×2× 16 = 256Mbit/s). The USRP2’s GBE connec-
tion can manage around 30MHz, which is enough for one sided capture of
GSM900. This would require the host computer to be able to process 100
MByte/s of data (25MHz ×2× 16 = 800Mbit/s) and even 200 MByte/s
for both up and down link, which is too much for most PCs.
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Of course some optimizations are possible. A single cell tower never
serves the entire GSM frequency band. This means that you can already
discard all carriers above the top frequency and all carriers below the
lowest frequency of a specific cell tower. However, that approach will not
work for most situations, since the maximal number of carriers (64) for
a single cell tower is still too much for the USRP. Also, since the USRP
can only receive a continuous frequency band, if the top and bottom
frequencies are too far apart, this approach will not work.
Another optimization would be to have the FPGA discard all channels
that have no traffic on them. This will of course only be effective if only
a few phones are active –as in calling – at the same time. It would be
even better to have the FPGA interpret enough of the bursts, so it can
already drop some that are not a part on the conversation the attacker
tries to capture. This optimization does see the same problems as those
with the first approach because it requires a lot of FPGA computation
– though less so, because the FPGA does not need to crack A5/1 in the
second approach.
The objections stated above, however, do not form a problem if the cell
tower under attack does not employ channel hopping, or only transmits
on a few frequencies in a tight spectrum. On such cell towers eavesdrop-
ping using an USRP seems a genuine possibility. It is not clear how many,
if any, of the cell towers in operation, match one of these conditions. This
makes it hard to estimate the risk in the current situation. During this
research only a handful of cell towers were observed, but none of those
fulfilled these conditions that would allow eavesdropping using the USRP.
Currently approach II seems to be the one that most people in the
AirProbe community believe is the correct one to follow. It does indeed
seem the easier way out, with a higher chance of success (on at least
some cell towers), though the FPGA programming needed here is by no
means a simple task. At least no one has communicated a way to tackle
this. This approach will probably not work in every situation, given the
problems with data throughput to the PC, but a working implementation
for some cell towers is enough for the AirProbe community to show that
they can listen in on GSM.
4.2 Decrypting using Kraken
A project was publicly announced in August of 2009 suggesting a way
to efficiently break the A5/1 cipher. This project runs under the, slightly
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unimaginative, name A5/1 [14]. However, in July 2010 the look-up tool
for this project was released and named Kraken. To avoid any confusion
with the cipher we will refer to the A5/1 project by the name Kraken.
The Kraken project mainly consists of creating large tables in a generic
time-memory trade off. This had been proposed before [15], but the distin-
guishing factor of this new project is that instead of computing the tables
at a single point everybody on the Internet can join in and compute a
table and then share them via bit torrent [16]. The code to compute these
tables can be downloaded and it runs on certain types of NVIDIA and
ATI graphics cards.
The idea behind these tables is as follows. The contents of several
bursts that are sent through the air, after encryption is enabled, can for
the most part be guessed. This gives known plain text samples. XORing
those plain text samples with the actually received cipher text reveals
keystream samples. The tables now function as a code book with 64 bits
of keystream that are mapped to internal A5/1 states producing that
exact piece of keystream.
There are 264 possible internal states for A5/1. That number is too
large to be able to map all internal states. So instead of just storing an
internal state and its 64 bits of keystream, they actually compute large
chains where for each link 64 of the output bits are again used as the
internal state. They only store the begin and end points of these chains.
Now when a piece of keystream is recovered, the attacker starts to make
a chain out of this keystream, but for every link he checks whether the
resulting value is stored in its table. If the attacker finds a hit, then
the attacker can recover the internal state by computing the original
chain from its stored begin point – from the internal state the session
key that was used can be computed, allowing for decryption of the entire
communication. This shrinks the size of the tables, but the attack time
is increased and the tables no longer guarantee that an internal state can
be found. But a much bigger problem that surfaces with this approach is
chain mergers. Several different internal states will compute the same 64
keystream bits causing different chains to ‘merge’ and cover the same part
of the key space. This makes the tables much less effective. To counter
some of these problems a combination of two techniques, one to decrease
the attack time and one to decrease the number of chain mergers, is used.
Those techniques are distinguished points and rainbow tables respectively.
Combining these techniques has been proposed before [17,18].
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Because of the chain mergers, a certain number of different tables
need to be produced. Those tables also need to cover a certain amount
of the entire key space. Recently a set of tables, named the ‘Berlin set’
was released together with the lookup tool, Kraken. The tables are dis-
tributed via bittorrent in a special transport format. Currently this is
around 1.5TB of data. This transport format can then be transcoded
into the actual read format, which takes just under 1.7TB disk space.
Currently the tables cover around 22% of the keyspace. If the key is in
the tables, then Kraken will typically find it within a few minutes (around
1 to 4 minutes) on a Intel Core2 Quad 2.33GHz machine with the tables
divided over several disks. Using solid state memory instead of conven-
tional hard drives for the table storage should significantly improve on
this look up time, at the expense of an increase in the financial costs.
A major drawback of this approach is that it requires faultless re-
ception of 64 consecutive bits. A single unnoticed error in a reception
will make it impossible to retrieve the session key using these tables. In
GSM the encryption is performed on top of the error detection codes, so
the error detection can not be used to find reception errors before the
decryption step. Currently the reception from the USRP, while running
AirProbe, does not provide the faultless reception needed by Kraken.
4.3 Interpreting using OpenBTS, or OpenBSC, or AirProbe
After the demodulation and decryption steps the bursts need to be inter-
preted. There are currently several open-source projects that implement
at least part of the GSM stack. These are the OpenBTS[19], OpenBSC[20]
and AirProbe[13] projects.
The OpenBTS and OpenBSC projects both aim to offer a functional
open-source GSM network. The AirProbe project on the other hand aims
to create a functional sniffer for GSM traffic. So for eavesdropping ac-
tivities the AirProbe project seems the most logical choice. However, the
AirProbe project is still lacking some essential functionality. For one, de-
ciding which type of burst is received is decided by the standard, most
likely, division of the broadcast channel, instead of making this decision
based on the burst. This means that the results are worse when cell tow-
ers use non-standard division of the broadcast channels. Also, currently
the AirProbe sniffers can only interpret some types of bursts. At the mo-
ment a lot of development to AirProbe is necessary in order to be able to
receive and interpret all of the GSM bursts.
This is mostly a practical issue though, which will be resolved in time.
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5 Countermeasures
As was already discussed in the introduction, theoretical attacks against
GSM are almost as old as the GSM system itself. So the GSM industry
has had ample time to prepare for the practical implementations of these
attacks. There are several countermeasures against these attacks, we will
discuss the effectiveness of three of these countermeasures here. These
are:
1. Encrypt content using A5/3
2. Use random padding in GSM packets
3. Use UMTS
5.1 Encrypt content using A5/3
In Section 3.2 we already briefly discussed the A5/3 cipher. This cipher
has been published from its inception, and as of yet no feasible attack
has been found. So using this cipher to encrypt conversations should
significantly hamper eavesdropping.
Indeed, pure eavesdropping will no longer be possible when using
A5/3, however it will not improve GSM’s security much. This is due to
the fact that irrespective of the choice of encryption algorithm, the session
key used will be the same. Basically the session key is created based on
the secret key, known only to the SIM card and the home network, and a
challenge transmitted by the cell tower. This challenge is transmitted in
the clear, so an attacker could just record the challenge and an A5/3 en-
crypted conversation, then at any later time pretend to be a base station
to the user and retransmit the challenge. This forces the user’s SIM to
compute the same session key, which could be broken in an A5/2 connec-
tion set up by the fake cell tower, and used to decrypt the conversation.
Also, this will not mitigate against MITM attacks. Finally the GSMA
(GSM Association) has been advising the use of A5/3 by providers since
2004, but it seems only a single small provider world-wide has ever made
this transition [21].
5.2 Use random padding
This defensive strategy specifically makes the Kraken attack discussed in
Section 4.2 harder. It revolves around the fact that the information in
GSM packets is padded to a standard length using a standard pattern of
“2b”. Some packets consist almost entirely of padding bits – the “cipher
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mode complete”, the first message a cell phone transmits enciphered to
the cell tower, usually has 144 of its 265 bits filled with padding bits –
which gives an attacker a large source of known plain text. However, the
length of the information bits is already described in the packet header,
making the standard padding pattern redundant.
These padding bits can thus be randomized, and that is exactly what
was specified by the ETSI in 2008 [22]. This would remove a large source
of known plaintext for an attacker. Without known plaintext there are no
known keystream samples which can be looked up in the Kraken tables.
It is questionable how fast this change will be implemented, however.
All the low level GSM processing is done by closed source GSM stacks,
so it is unknown whether this change would affect the already deployed
equipment. All the mobile handsets in the field can not be updated, so
this change can only be made in new phones. Also this change will not
completely remove any known plain text from the system. Some messages
can still be guessed, such as system information messages, making the
attack described in Section 4.2 still feasible for longer conversations.
5.3 Use UMTS
This is kind of a cop-out, but a method that is at least currently avail-
able to quite some users. The successors of GSM – the 3G systems, mostly
UMTS – offer much better security. Specifically it has mutual authenti-
cation between cell tower and mobile phone – preventing MITM attacks
– and offers stronger encryption, that has seen academic scrutiny.
In order to fully use this added security, a user should deactivate his
phone’s GSM reception, and solely use UMTS. Otherwise an attacker
could force a phone to use GSM, by jamming the UMTS frequencies. Of
course the usability of this solution will depend on the availability of a
UMTS network to the specific user, and might have additional data costs.
6 Conclusions
Passively eavesdropping on GSM remains pretty hard to do using publicly
available hard and software. Theoretically, there are no real constraints
in breaking conversation confidentiality in GSM. However, there are still
several practical issues preventing a working implementation of a GSM
sniffer using freely available hardware.
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Of the three steps named in Section 3 the first – capturing the GSM
signals from the air – remains the bottleneck. Especially the channel hop-
ping used in GSM networks – which is not even a security measure –
prevents the correct capture of GSM packets.
With the current state-of-the-art, the best way to capture GSM data
from the air proved the use of an old Nokia phone (3310), which can be
put in a debug mode, logging all the GSM bursts it receives. However,
this will never reveal bursts that are not meant for this specific phone,
and can therefore never be used for eavesdropping. The combination of
the USRP, with Gnu Radio and AirProbe currently does not deliver the
possibilities needed for eavesdropping.
The release of the rainbow tables and the Kraken tool has made the
breaking of the A5/1 encryption much easier. However, this approach
does have a few downsides: besides the hard disk size this method also
requires perfect samples – putting additional strain on the capturing pro-
cess – and naturally the tables will never give a 100% chance of finding
the key. Still, the current coverage of 22% of the key space should be
workable given enough samples.
The practical problems that at the moment prevent a general attack
tool can vary with the specific practical situation. Frequency hopping
might not be employed by a specific cell tower, or the cell tower trans-
mits on only a few frequencies that lie close together. In fact a cell tower
might not even use encryption. In those cases many attacks become much
easier, but we do not know if and how many cell towers have such a config-
uration. During this research all observed cell towers used both frequency
hopping and encryption.
The same practical problems will probably prevent any general attack
tool to be released using the current generation of hardware. It is more
likely that a tool will be released that can eavesdrop on some cell towers,
though again without publicly available numbers on the configuration
of cell towers it is hard to judge how many cell towers are vulnerable.
In the mean time the open-source GSM projects have not yet directly
worsened the confidentiality of conversations over GSM. Despite many
recent claims to the contrary no actual conversation has been captured
and decrypted, and it will take a lot of effort before the current problems
preventing these attacks are solved.
It is hard to predict how long it will take the current community be-
hind these open-source projects to solve these practical problems. Though
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reactions from the community seem eager, the recent rate of development
in for instance AirProbe do not show much progress.
Of the countermeasures that are often referred to by the GSM industry
when downplaying the news stories, the most effective one is essentially
to by-pass GSM all together and use solely UMTS in stead.
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